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1. Introduction 
In democracies, written constitutions typically establish two main sets of institutional frameworks or 
regimes: firstly, a frame of government, setting up the organisation of the state the rules by which it is 
to function, including, crucially, its ‘checks and balances’; and secondly, a set of rights and freedoms 
guaranteed to the citizen. Most constitutions also provide for what may be conceptualised as a third 
regime: a state of emergency, which provides for the possibility of suspension of elements of the first 
two. States of emergency are therefore departures from the regular constitutional situation and its 
norms, usually authorised and delineated by constitutions themselves as temporary states of affairs 
during which governments (or certain branches of government) are equipped with extraordinary 
powers. As with other features, a great deal of variation exists between different constitutions’ 
provisions defining states of emergency. Naturally, there is also considerable variation in the way 
different states act under a state of emergency: the way a state of emergency functions, and the 
consequences for human rights, vary enormously between different countries and different times. The 
relation between these two variations, those of constitutional stipulation and of political practice, is of 
considerable interest to the study of the functioning of democratic institutions. 
The variation in constitutional emergency provisions seems to consist of two main elements: the 
derogation of rights and the procedures governing the state of emergency. The main effect of a state of 
emergency is usually to remove constitutional protections that normally apply to enumerated 
fundamental rights and freedoms; yet, in most constitutions, some rights are listed as non-derogable, 
meaning that they are supposed to be protected even during a state of emergency. The enumeration of 
different rights as either derogable or non-derogable varies by country, and most previous research of 
the effect of emergency provisions has focused on this variation. This thesis focuses on the second 
aspect: provisions defining the conditions and procedures regulating the state of emergency – most 
importantly, the duration for which emergency powers continue in force, as well as the power to 
declare and extend them. The duration is often limited, with automatic expiration of a state of 
emergency unless it is renewed before a certain date; the procedure for declaring and extending a state 
of emergency, meanwhile, usually allocate the power to the legislature, to the executive, or to the 
executive , subject to quick confirmation by the legislature. There are also various other restrictions 
worth considering, such as the limitation of government powers existing under normal conditions, 
such as the parliamentary dissolution power, which also affects the power of the legislature. 
This investigation is based on the idea that political institutions – meaning the rules that structure the 
‘game’ of political interaction – incentivise political actors and channel their ambitions into various 
patterns of actions and outcomes. Previous research on the connection between the institutions and 
conduct of states of emergency has focused on the human rights record in countries with different 
kinds of emergency provisions. This thesis sets forth the investigation of a different type of dependent 
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variable: the prevalence of states of emergency, meaning the frequency and duration of their 
occurrence. This variable can tell us something about what the use of emergency powers is like in 
practice, as longer durations have been found to be associated with a decline in respect for human 
rights. But more importantly, they can tell us about the effectiveness of different prescribed procedures 
in restricting the use of emergency powers, which, after all, are supposed to be temporary measures in 
a democracy – though this is not always the case in practice. 
The procedures and rules regulating emergency powers could influence the prevalence by establishing 
different decision-making costs and incentives. This thesis investigates three channels through which 
this might happen – firstly, through the procedures for declaring, extending, and ending states of 
emergency; secondly, through the constitutional time-limits causing expiration unless it is renewed 
before a certain deadline; and thirdly through the prohibition of parliamentary dissolution, which can 
increase the political cost (for the government) of maintaining a state of emergency. All three could be 
summarised as provisions affecting the power of the legislature over and during states of emergency, 
and this investigation hypothesises that provisions strengthening the hand of legislatures in this 
context should reduce the prevalence of states of emergency. 
Using data from 95 democracies from 1994 through 2004, these hypotheses are tested through the 
application of logistic regression to identify whether the relative odds of a state of emergency being in 
place is reduced given emergency provisions that empower the legislature. In addition, it also adds the 
innovation of accounting for variation in the regular political conditions (effective number of parties) 
and institutions (executive format) of government, which should also influence the operation of the 
emergency provisions noted above. This study controls for these as well as for two variables 
accounting for the effect of armed conflict and events threatening the regime – circumstances that may 
be seen as emergencies and therefore are likely to be associated with the use of emergency powers. 
Ultimately, the results are not able to provide evidence in favour of above hypotheses. Improvements 
to this paper’s data and methodology could still return more encouraging results. However, more 
meaningfully, this initial investigation may recommend a different perspective – namely, that the 
simple rules encompassed in these hypotheses – control over declaration and extension by a legislative 
majority, and prohibition on the dissolution of the same – may be fundamentally insufficient to restrict 
the prevalence of states of emergency. As Ackerman (2004) argues, more restrictive and creative 
provisions – some of which can be found in certain existing constitutions – could be the way to 
achieve this goal, which clearly suggests a path future research could take. 
This paper is structured as follows: part 2 offers a theoretical overview of the issues involved in 
emergency provisions and the determinants of their use, through the exploration of the questions of 
what brings about different outcomes of states of emergency, of the role of different circumstances and 
of different institutions; part 3 follows with a survey of the findings of previous investigations of the 
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role of institutions; part 4 sets out this study’s hypotheses and their underlying rationale; part 5 lays 
out the methodology and data used to test these empirically; part 6 presents the results of the empirical 
investigation; finally, part 7 interprets and discusses these results, making suggestions for future 
research. 
 
2. Theoretical overview 
i. Why do state of emergency provisions have different outcomes in practice? 
While constitutions, at least in liberal democracies, have amongst their principal functions constraints 
on arbitrary power and the protection of individual rights, experience with crisis and emergency 
situations have always given rise to the debate whether free government permits room for extra-legal 
action. Both sides to the debate have long historical roots and have found some reflection in 
constitutional practices. In recent times the notion of derogation from usual constitutional norms in 
times of emergency has come to enjoy widespread institution. Roughly nine out of ten national 
constitutions provide for the proclamation of a state of emergency during which civil liberties and 
procedural rights may be suspended (Bjørnskov & Voigt 2015). Just between 1985 and 2014, 
hundreds of states of emergency have been declared in at least 137 countries. While some core aspects 
are essentially the same across different states of emergency, emergency powers are often exercised 
very differently, with different levels of respect for human rights, different durations, different 
frequencies and ultimately also for different reasons and ends. 
States of exception have often been linked to repression by rulers of threats to their regime (Keith & 
Poe 2004, 1075); sometimes, repression is clearly the intent behind such provisions, allowing frequent 
derogations from bills of rights that therefore amount to little more than a façade. This is clearest in 
non-democratic regimes; Egypt, for example, has been under a continuous state of emergency since 
attaining sovereignty, providing cover for the repression of political opposition in the country (Reza 
2007). Obviously, the difference in use of emergency powers between many countries can plausibly be 
explained by the difference in regime type, meaning how accountable the government is to its 
citizenry, ranging from dictatorship to liberal democracy. In a dictatorship, coercion is used differently 
by the government than a state where access to power is open to democratic competition, and the 
difference in distribution of power as well as norms and expectations induce different patterns of 
tolerance for state brutality. That is to say, politicians in a democracy are more wary of public opinion 
in the short term. Citizens’ awareness of this and ability to voice their displeasure means that even if 
emergency provisions were to be abused, the public backlash may in general be expected to be 
quicker, larger and ultimately more effective than under a dictatorship. In the latter, protest is rarer and 
effective protest rarer still, due to the facts that criticism and protest are repressed and that they are less 
likely to have an impact even if repression is ineffective, due to the relative difficulty of holding 
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leaders accountable to public opinion, which has no effective constitutional expression. In short, the 
incentive structures which are crucial to the most minimal functioning of rules and constraints on 
states of emergency, exist only in constitutional democracies – that is therefore to be the domain of 
this investigation. 
However, the use of emergency provisions also differs greatly among democracies. A large majority 
of countries have explicit emergency provisions in their constitutions, yet other countries provide for 
them by law (Bjørnskov & Voigt 2015, 3; Ackerman 2004). Meanwhile, the pattern of usage and 
conduct varies greatly. Latin American countries seem to have a particular history of invoking 
emergency powers (Loveman 1993) during both autocratic and more democratic periods (Wright 
2013, 145). However, there are large disparities, as the data combining reports on states of 
emergencies suggest. While a number of countries have been reporting consistently, Peru has reported 
a far greater number of emergency declarations than others (Zwitter 2014). In Europe they have not 
been as common; but there have been notable exceptions. Under Germany’s Weimar Republic (1919-
1933), Presidents made extensive use of the country’s vague grant of emergency power to make 
decrees with the force of law, increasingly supplanting the Reichstag’s role in the legislative process 
(Shugart & Carey 1992). Another more democratic example is Israel, which, despite being a 
democracy, has (like Egypt – providing a sharp contrast in terms of regime type) been under continual 
state of emergency ever since its independence, under a declaration which has been renewed annually 
by the country’s parliament (Ackerman 2004).  
ii. Different outcomes: the role of differences in emergency circumstances 
The above disparities almost certainly owe much to the different circumstances existing in different 
countries which give rise to state of emergency declarations. The occurrence, frequency and severity 
of crisis situations, whether natural (such as earthquakes or epidemics) or man-made (terrorism, 
violent strikes, civil or international armed conflict) obviously vary between countries, and this 
variation may be expected to influence the pattern of usage of constitutional emergency powers. 
Nevertheless, there are a number of facts that hint that something more is at play. Most importantly, it 
is absolutely clear that the threshold applied by politicians for the invocation of emergency powers has 
varied enormously among democracies and within them over time. Furthermore, the histories of many 
of those states of emergency indicate that (whether or not specific instances actually constitute cases of 
abuse) emergency powers have frequently been utilised by politicians for their own ends, quite 
separately from any ‘benevolent’ or ‘pragmatic’ use of emergency powers – meaning, their use as a 
means of resolving a crisis situation to the benefit of the public (even if at the expense of the rights of 
individuals). Archer & Shugart (1997, 125-130), for example, show how, in Colombia, emergency 
powers meant for dealing with natural disaster or public disorders were from the 1950’s to 1991 
extensively used by presidents to get around Congress in policymaking, tackling not only ‘natural’ or 
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‘political’ sources of disorder but also ‘economic’ ones. Between 1958 and 1991, they write, 
Colombia was under a state of siege for about three-quarters of the time (126). India’s famous 1975-
1977 state of emergency invoked by then-Prime Minister Indira Gandhi is another clear example (Huq 
2006). In that case, emergency powers were used to suppress opposition groups through censorship 
and mass detention as well as passing a wide swath of policies on federal and state levels (otherwise 
prohibited to the federal government) with minimal scrutiny, all the while shutting down anti-
corruption proceedings under way against government ministers and the Prime Minister herself (Ibid, 
132-133). Such cases demonstrate that in practice, states of emergency declarations can be 
independent from actual emergency situations, which means that disparities in use of emergency 
powers between different countries are not only caused by different practical emergency 
circumstances, but are also shaped by the motivations of politicians. These motivations are shaped by 
various factors, one of which is a country’s institutions – the political rules of the game. 
iii. The importance of institutions 
While constitutional design has long accommodated the state of emergency as a regime presented as a 
matter of pragmatism for the resolution of serious crises, Bjørnskov & Voigt’s (2015) findings are that 
actual constitutional emergency provisions in different countries do not correlate well with the 
presence of various contextual considerations associated with various emergency circumstances. 
Based on this, they argue, the motivation behind including states of exception in constitutions do not 
necessarily have the common good at heart. Their results conform more closely to hypotheses 
reasoned from the perspective that the motivation behind states of exception provisions is more often 
malevolent – the result of authoritarian motivations – than the result of pragmatic considerations 
relating to the country’s socioeconomic, political and geographical context. Bjørnskov & Voigt’s 
research highlights the fact that emergency provisions were not created equal – that constitutional 
states of emergency differ in important ways. For this research paper, the interesting thing is that it 
also suggests that these institutional differences may be expected to matter to policymakers and their 
conduct during states of emergency. Otherwise, those framing constitutions would not bother shaping 
them to suit their ends, leading the type of provision to correlate instead with the practical 
circumstances likely to arise (as would the outcomes), or vary at random, favouring none of Bjørnskov 
& Voigt’s different hypotheses in particular. 
Constitutions define emergency regimes and powers in various different ways, while also establishing 
different procedures for their initiation, extension and termination. These rules are supposed to govern 
the practical functioning of states of exception, as well as provide incentives for officials to restrict the 
extent and purposes to which emergency powers are used. Even for those who accept the necessity of 
such provisions, their design remains a complicated issue. In order to manage extreme circumstances 
which might arise, constitutions must be able to exhibit a certain degree of flexibility which allows 
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them to ‘bend, but not break’, when the necessity arises, and yet adequately constrain the executive in 
order to prevent dictatorial excesses and abuse. The effort to limit emergency powers through 
institutional constraints and incentives is as old as emergency powers themselves – and subsequent 
authors of constitutions have attempted to find new and better ways of doing so. An important modern 
contribution to this institutionalist thinking about states of emergency was made by Bruce Ackerman 
(2004), who argued that emergency provisions could play a useful and necessary role in modern 
democracies, providing policymakers tools to fight terrorism, reassuring the population that the 
government is taking action, and to prevent more long-term undermining of basic rights. Nonetheless, 
he argued that existing emergency provisions around the world are ill-crafted, providing too few 
procedural rules and incentives to prevent abuse and to ensure that states of emergency are kept brief; 
Ackerman therefore listed detailed suggestions of procedural rules that, in his view, might do better at 
achieving these ends. A key assumption behind Bjørnskov and Voigt’s (2015) work is that 
constitutional framers believed that institutions indeed would make a difference to the operation of 
states of emergency. 
The foregoing authors and framers of constitutions have clearly been convinced of the case that at a 
fundamental level, institutions matter: that constitutional provisions do influence the exercise of 
emergency powers. But is that in fact the case? Do the institutional structure and rules provided by 
democratic constitutions influence the conduct of officials with regards to the state of emergency in 
the ways that concern us, i.e. with regards to frequency, extent, and respect for human rights? These 
questions merit investigation, because if we know what works, we can fashion emergency provisions 
that fulfil our intended goals more effectively, ensuring a better balance between liberty and security 
in emergency situations. 
 
3. The effect of emergency constitutional provisions on state of emergency conduct: the results 
so far 
So far, research on the effect of institutions on the exercise of emergency power has mostly focused on 
the effect on human rights. A key part of state of emergency provisions is that they suspend human 
rights declared to be fundamental and protected from the law under regular circumstances; almost 
universally, this is coupled together with a clause that makes certain rights non-derogable. Richards & 
Clay (2012) specifically investigated non-derogability for seven human rights during declared states of 
emergency from 1996 to 2004 in 195 countries, running ordered logistic regressions to test the 
relationship between a state of emergency being in force and respect for an array of rights. Richards & 
Clay summarize their findings by writing that protection for non-derogable rights are “anemic at best” 
(p465), with declared-state-of-emergency status in fact being associated with a drop in respect for both 
derogable and non-derogable rights, with few exceptions. Richard & Clay’s models controlled for 
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whether an emergency was national or regional in scope, with the finding that nationwide declarations 
frequently bodes worse for respect for human rights (p462 – 465). Other control variables included 
contextual measures such as domestic conflict and national wealth, and a measure of regime type – 
key factors that have been known to affect the use of emergency powers and respect for human rights 
(as described above); almost all control variables performed as expected (p460). Richards & Clay do 
not directly cover the procedures, frequency or duration of states of emergency, but their paper does 
point to the importance of such a research agenda. Firstly, there is the clear indication that states of 
emergency are associated with lesser respect for human rights, a simple (and perhaps obvious) finding 
but one that nonetheless suggests the importance of procedures governing the very occurrence of states 
of emergency – as a reduction in use of emergency powers could be expected to increase respect for 
human rights overall. Secondly, as the authors emphasise in the conclusion (p467), the finding that 
non-derogability by itself seems to be inadequate can be seen as a sign that better monitoring regimes 
are necessary, something that well-framed state of emergency procedural provisions could contribute 
to. 
Keith & Poe (2004) similarly investigated the effects of constitutional emergency provisions on the 
respect for human rights in situations where governments are faced with domestic crises. Unlike 
Richards & Clay, their variables included not only provisions affecting human rights and derogability, 
but also the procedures and rules governing state of emergency – specifically, the power to declare a 
state of emergency, limitations on its duration and extension, and the prohibition on dissolving the 
legislature during a state of emergency. Keith & Poe also controlled for judicial independence, civil 
and international war experience, economic development, population size, as well as for the level of 
domestic threat. This last factor is intended to capture the difference between different situations 
which might elicit a response of repression (and use of a state of emergency) – protests, rebellion, etc. 
– that (due to the different levels of threat to the regime) should be associated with different 
likelihoods that repression will be used and that provisions protecting non-derogable rights will be 
ignored (Keith & Poe 2004, 1084-6, 1093). Their hypotheses, however, are ambivalent. On the one 
hand, a high level of threat to the regime is predicted to lead to lower effectiveness of the clauses 
intended to limit emergency powers, with emergency events that do not threaten the regime as much 
being associated with respect for those restrictions. On the other hand, if restrictive clauses “provide 
cover” for the government and are used as “rationalization” for greater human rights abuses, the 
presence of those clauses is expected to decrease respect for human rights at the lower threat levels 
(p1085-6). 
Keith & Poe’s results were mixed. There was no clear progression from threat level to threat level in 
the observed effectiveness of limiting clauses on the severity of repression – not in line with either the 
descending hypothesis or the ascending one. Where the threat level was low, the clauses appeared to 
have no effect one way or the other; midlevel threats such as rebellions (violent or non-violent) were 
9 
 
associated with a negative effect, as provisions limiting the duration of an emergency or listing non-
derogable rights were found to be associated with worse human rights abuse. Only at the highest level 
of threat, during civil wars, were such provisions (specifically allocating the power to declare a state of 
emergency to the legislature and protecting non-derogable rights) associated with reduced levels of 
human rights abuse (Keith & Poe 2004, 1096). Keith & Poe do not provide an altogether clear or 
coherent explanation for this pattern; indeed, they reason that the real world simply “is not so 
accommodating” as to provide “general laws, applying equally to all cases” (p1097). The authors 
instead emphasized the negative results obtained: “Providing a constitutional list of rights that can be 
derogated during a state of emergency apparently allows some regimes to rationalize the suspension of 
rights… [while the] presence of the duration clause, likewise, sometimes appears to increase human 
rights abuses, perhaps by encouraging regimes to continue to extend a state of emergency” (p1097). 
They do not, however, offer any further explanation for why this should be the case. 
Though previous researchers have touched on the role of constitutional provisions in structuring the 
incentives of office-holders in using emergency powers, they have not explored the question of what 
influences whether or not emergency powers are used at all. Effectively, this question concerns the 
prevalence of states of emergency in different countries and how this is influenced by their emergency 
regimes. This is an obvious question, considering the existence of constitutional provisions 
establishing deadlines for states of emergency, prescribing different procedures for declaring and 
extending them (some more onerous than others), and establishing various restrictions on powers. If 
these matter, as political scientists and authors of constitutions seem to think, they should be observed 
to influence how commonly emergency powers are resorted to as a policy solution. Moreover, as 
previous investigations have in fact indicated, the very recourse to emergency powers clearly affects 
such variables as respect for human rights (Keith & Poe 2004), and this effect is compounded the 
longer a state of emergency is made to last (Richards & Clay 2012). Foregoing research therefore 
offers compelling reasons for the investigation of these questions. 
 
4. Hypotheses 
i. Operationalisation 
Declaration 
The power to declare a state of emergency is usually broadly structured in one of the following ways 
(Keith & Poe, 2004; Choudhry & Stacey 2013, 27-28; Elkins, Ginsburg & Melton 2009): 
(a) Unilateral declaration by the executive – e.g. France, Sri Lanka and Chile; 
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(b) Declaration by the executive subject to a requirement of ratification by the legislature within a 
tight timeframe – e.g. Brazil, which requires legislative consent within ten days, and Romania, 
which requires it within five; 
(c) Declaration by the legislature – e.g. Finland, Argentina and Greece. 
More rarely, there is no explicit allocation of the power, as in the United States (Huq 2009). 
Unilateral executive declaration leaves the power to activate emergency powers in the very hands 
which make most use of them during a state of emergency, and therefore likely to be the most keen to 
activate them in the face of any challenge that could provide an excuse to do so (Loveman 1993; 
Ackerman 2004). Such an arrangement may therefore be expected to make states of emergency 
declarations more frequent than any other, while every structure that increases the power of the 
legislature to veto a declaration should increase the decision-making cost involved, and therefore make 
resort to emergency powers less frequent. In most past and current cases, legislative control over 
declaration has been vested in a majority – however, a stricter possibility is to require a supermajority, 
which should raise the decision-making cost even higher, as it effectively gives a veto to minorities in 
the legislature. Other factors not accounted for above include the requirement to formally consult with 
certain constitutional bodies (e.g. a constitutional court) or officeholders (e.g. the chief justice, or the 
legislature’s presiding officer). Such a requirement frequently exists where executive power to declare 
is essentially unilateral; it may affect the decision-making by putting out a formal opinion the 
executive might find hard to ignore (Choudhry & Stacey 2013, 27) but is otherwise relatively minor. 
Duration/extension 
In line with the principle that emergency powers are supposed to be temporary, most constitutions 
specify a duration after which a state of emergency expires unless renewed – for example, in Costa 
Rica a state of emergency lapses after a month if not extended by the legislature; South Africa allows 
the initial period to last 21 days, after which the legislature may extend for three months at a time 
(Elkins, Ginsburg & Melton 2009). Such a requirement by itself already increases the cost for 
policymakers of letting a state of emergency continue, even if the authority to extend a state of 
exception lies with the same offices or officeholders as its initial proclamation and/or approval – with 
consequences for its total duration. The higher the formal decision-making cost of an extension 
(meaning the more officeholders must agree to it, and thus, more veto-players), the less likely 
extensions are likely to be approved and therefore the shorter exceptional states are likely to last. 
Moreover, positive actions are more likely to be influenced by various pressures than the inherently 
passive failure to act, mainly because those involved are more likely to be held accountable for it – and 
when states of emergency have a deadline, positive action is needed to renew it. As a vote to extend 
may be registered and come to public knowledge, potentially endangering re-election prospects, 
elected officeholders may be expected to be increasingly unlikely to grant extensions. 
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The cost of extending a state of exception should, like its initiation, be affected by the allocation of 
that power to different players. As with declaration, there are many different variations, but the 
available data allows only for the central distinction: whether or not the legislature must ratify the 
extension, and by what majority. Naturally, the cost of securing the approval of a majority of 
legislators should be higher than simply letting the executive make the decision unilaterally, and so the 
former should more often lead to the termination of a state of emergency. Another variation which 
probably poses a far weaker constraint than the usual legislative ratification deadline is the provision, 
first introduced in France, that a state of emergency, initiated by the President, may be challenged 
before the constitutional court after three months by the presiding officer of either house or 60 
members of either house; the court may then decide to end the state of emergency if it finds that the 
circumstances that gave rise to it no longer exist (Ackerman 2004, 1038) 
Dissolution power 
Finally, another common provision that could affect the duration and frequency of states of emergency 
is a prohibition on dissolution of the legislature during a state of emergency, which exists, for 
example, in France and Spain. Not all countries have a dissolution in power at all, but in the many that 
do, it might be used if not specifically banned during a state of emergency. If the dissolution power is 
not suspended, the chief executive has a strong tool that can be used against any kind of legislative 
opposition to or interference in the government’s use of emergency power. 
Provisions banning dissolution are therefore an important factor in the ability of the legislature to 
monitor government conduct during the state of emergency and to apply pressure on the executive. 
Often, the effect may only manifest itself in the executive’s conduct, but it should at least in some 
cases hasten the end of a state of emergency either through (where this is possible) early termination 
by the legislature, or through non-ratification of a proposed extension. Dissolution of the legislature 
should be expected to severely interfere with this possibility where the legislature must be recalled for 
extension votes, and disable it completely where this is not the case. 
The above arguments produce three hypotheses which are here subjected to empirical testing: 
i. The stronger the involvement of the legislature in declaring a state of emergency, the lesser 
the frequency of states of emergency. 
ii. Restriction of duration and a requirement for legislative confirmation for extension reduce the 
overall time spent under a state of emergency. 
iii. Restriction of the power to dissolve the legislature during a state of emergency reduces the 
overall time spent under a state of emergency. 
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5. Data and Methods 
Independent variables 
The independent variable is, as explained above, the variation that exists between the different 
countries’ constitutional provisions concerning states of exception. The operationalisation focuses on 
the main elements of variation and categorises emergency provisions in a simple fashion, without, for 
example, distinguishing between provisions that require supermajority as opposed to supermajority 
support. The data for these are from Keith & Poe (2004 – with data extensively updated since then) 
and the Inter-Parliamentary Union’s database (“PARLINE: Oversight Module”). These are coded as 
follows: 
Declaration 
2 = declaration by the legislature; 
1 = states of emergency (declared by the executive) are explicitly subject to confirmation by the 
legislature; 
0 = no mention of who has the power to declare such a state; and 
-1 = unilateral declaration by the executive1. 
Extension/duration 
2 = duration of the emergency is specified for a set time period and extensions are subject to 
legislative approval; 
1 = duration is specified or legislative approval is specified but not both; and 
0 = no mention of duration or extension process. 
Dissolution power 
2 = the legislature may not be dissolved during the emergency or meets “by right”; 
1 = vague provision for legislature meeting but no explicit prevention from dissolving the legislature 
(i.e., may say that legislature can prolong length of session or can reconvene); 
0 = no mention of dissolving legislature in regard to states of emergency; and 
                                                          
1 Including French-style provisions allowing for judicial review after a three-month period. 
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- 1 = automatically suspends the legislature during a state of emergency or gives the executive explicit 
power to do so. 
Dependent variables 
The source of these data is Richards & Clay (2012). Their original study only goes back to 1996, but 
was later expanded back to and including 1994. The dependent variables are declared state of 
emergency status, i.e. whether or not a state of emergency was in place in any given country-year, 
simply coded2: 
0 = no state of emergency was in place at any point during the year; and 
1 = a state of emergency was in place at some point during the year. 
Control variables 
Effective number of parties 
While the institutional factor of the decision-making costs associated with different procedures written 
into constitutional emergency regimes has received some treatment in the literature (Keith & Poe 
2004), previous researchers seem not to have controlled for other institutional or political factors 
which can play a crucial role in determining those decision-making costs. The difficulty of passing any 
measure through a legislature depends to a great extent on the effective number of actors involved: the 
more parties there are, and the less united they are, the greater the effective number of actors, and the 
greater the difficulty. For example, an assembly where one party has a majority, securing the support 
of that party – likely to be the government – is all that is necessary; but if that party’s leadership is not 
able to control the votes of its legislators, one may need to convince some of those legislators 
individually. Effectively, party fragmentation, and low party unity, increases the number of veto 
players (Tsebelis 2002). 
The effective number of parties is a standard indicator, devised by Laakso and Taagepera in 1979 as a 
way of operationalising party fragmentation (Gallagher & Mitchell 2005, 598). It is calculated as 
follows: 
                                                          
2 In the source data, this is further divided according to territorial scope: 
0 = Regional in scope; and 
1 = national in scope. 
Originally, I intended to include this factor, but encountered a number of problems. Firstly, there might not be 
enough data to include it (36 and 17 cases, respectively, out of a total 852 observations, and secondly though I 
thought originally that there was a way to include it using regular logit regressions, it eventually became clear 
that the theory I had formulated was not sophisticated enough to develop expectations for separate 
regressions – so the only solution would be an ordered logit regression, which was too complicated, at least 
with the little time I had remaining. 
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Where 
 p is a party’s share of the total number of seats in the legislature; and 
 N is the effective number of parties in a legislature 
Gallagher’s (2015) database calculates these values for various countries on the basis of election 
results, which can be used for our purposes. 
Party unity is harder to factor in, but executive format – the institutional structure of the executive 
branch, such as presidential or parliamentary – has been found to be a key factor (Carey 2009, 131), 
and is included below. Of course, the influence of these factors only comes into play where the 
legislature is required to ratify a decision concerning a state of emergency, so these must be included 
as an interaction effect between the effective number of parties and the declaration and extension 
variables. 
Executive format 
Meanwhile, the executive format itself might play an important independent role with regard to the use 
of states of emergency, but there is no clear indication in the literature as to what role. On the one 
hand, presidential regimes have historically been perceived to be associated with the use of emergency 
powers. While this link is not made explicitly, Linz (1994, 7-8) argues that the separation of powers 
often leads to inter-branch conflict and to deadlock, which might be seen as a background for recourse 
to emergency powers by presidents in order to bypass the legislature in policymaking. However, this 
can conflict with the party unity explanation above, which would expect lower party unity and so a 
greater difficulty of passing a state of emergency where legislative ratification is required. On the 
other hand, it may be that through their ability to remove the prime minister, legislatures in 
parliamentary (and semi-presidential) systems possess a tool that can help force the government to end 
a state of emergency – a tool that strengthens the power to terminate it where the legislature possesses 
it, and effectively provides one where the legislature does not. However, as parties in parliamentary 
systems are typically more tightly organised, and their leaders have stronger control over their MPs 
(Carey 2009), it may actually take longer before external pressure leads individual MPs to rebel 
against the party leadership to take action against a state of emergency, especially when their legal 
immunity may be compromised by that very state of emergency (Huq 2006, 132-133). Overall, 
therefore, it is difficult to say what may be expected from different executive formats. 
In order to categorise regimes most efficiently and with least definitional issues, the coding will be as 
follows, in two separate categorisations. The data are taken from the Inter-Parliamentary Union’s 
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database (“PARLINE: Oversight Module”) with gaps filled in from the Comparative Constitutions 
Project’s database (Elkins, Ginsburg & Melton 2009). 
Election of the head of state or chief executive 
1 = the head of state/chief executive is popularly elected3; 
0 = the head of state/chief executive is hereditary or indirectly-elected 
Ministerial responsibility 
1 = ministers cannot be removed by a majority of the legislature (or its lower house); 
0 = ministers can be removed by majority vote of the legislature (or its lower house). 
Countries coded (1,1) are presidential, countries coded (1,0) tend to be called semi-presidential, and 
countries coded (0,0) are almost always parliamentary (Shugart & Carey 1992; Samuels & Shugart 
2010). 
Emergency circumstances 
As discussed above, various types of events may give rise to state of emergency declarations by virtue 
of being perceived by the government as crises requiring the use of emergency powers. Most 
prominently among these are various forms of threats by the regime and violent conflict, which are 
also controlled for by Keith & Poe (2004) and Richards & Clay (2012) as logical, if not necessarily 
legitimate, situations where emergency powers may be invoked. For the purposes of this thesis, these 
are the most logical predictors of states of emergency, also based on Bjørnskov & Voigt 2015. 
These are both simple dichotomous variables. The measure for domestic threat type is taken from 
Keith & Poe (2004). The data for armed conflict is taken from the Centre for the Study of Civil War’s 
Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflicts Dataset and includes all intrastate and interstate conflicts with a death 
toll of at least 25 in a given year (Gleditsch et al. 2002).  
Method 
As the data recording the occurrence of a state of emergency in any year in dichotomous, it is possible 
to use a simple logistic regression to estimate the change in odds of a state of emergency occurring in 
any country-year based on the independent and control variables. 
                                                          
3 Meaning directly elected or indirectly elected by a body elected directly for the sole purpose of electing the 
president (my definition, based on Shugart & Carey 1992). For example, the President of the United States is 
popularly elected, the presidents of Germany and Surinam are not. 
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6. Results 
Table 1 displays the occurrence of declared states of emergency in this paper’s sample of 95 countries 
during the 1994-2004 period; for most countries the years 1994 through 2004 are included, for others 
some years are excluded during which the country did not score higher than a 5 on the Polity IV index 
(to qualify as democracies). A total of 852 country-year observations, or about 57.5%, were included 
out of Richard & Clay’s (2012) complete dataset, which includes non-democracies. More than two-
thirds (68%) of declared state of emergency in the sample were regional in scope, about the inverse 
proportion from Richard & Clay’s complete dataset. 
Table 1 Occurrence and types of declared states of emergency 
 Declared state of emergency status 
 Frequency Share 
No declared state of emergency 53 6.2% 
Declared state of emergency 799 93.8% 
N 852  
Table 2 presents the correlation matrix including all the variables. As there is no significant correlation 
between the variables (i.e. multicollinearity; no correlation surpassed 0.6), all the variables set out 
above can be included in the analysis. 
Table 2 Variables correlation matrix 
Variable Conflict Threat  Eff. 
Parties 
Elected 
chief 
executive 
Confidence 
vote 
Declaration Extension Dissolution 
ban 
Conflict  0.57 0.10 -0.01 -0.06 -0.13 0.20 0.01 
Threat 0.57  0.00 0.10 -0.06 -0.13 0.12 0.10 
Eff. Parties 0.10 0.00 
 
 0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.11 -0.07 
Elected 
chief 
executive 
-0.01 0.10 0.02  0.46 0.04 -0.02 0.37 
Confidence 
vote 
-0.06 -0.06 0.00 0.46  -0.12 0.15 0.51 
Declaration -0.13 -0.13 -0.02 0.04 -0.12  -0.07 -0.10 
Extension 0.20 0.12 -0.11 -0.02 0.15 -0.07  0.06 
Dissolution 
ban 
0.01 0.10 -0.07 0.37 0.51 -0.10 0.06  
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Table 3 shows the results from logit regression analyses testing the association between the three 
categories of constitutional emergency provisions considered here (declaration, extension, and 
dissolution ban) and state of emergency status, alongside other factors described above as likely to 
have such an association.  
All standard errors reported in parentheses are “robust” standard errors – these have been adjusted for 
country-specific clustering in the same way as Richards & Clay (2012, 458) in order to take into 
account that while observations are assumed to be independent across different countries, they are not 
independent over different years within the same country. The presence of autocorrelation was 
confirmed by applying a Breusch-Godfrey test, which had the following output: Lagrange multiplier 
statistic = 202.37, degrees of freedom= 1, and p-value < 2.2*10^16, thus rejecting the null hypothesis 
of there being no autocorrelation present. 
Table 3  Logit estimates of declared state of emergency: constitutional declaration, extension 
and dissolution ban provisions 
predictor 
 
Declaration –0.237 
(1.469) 
Extension –0.906 
(1.374) 
Dissolution ban –0.568 
(0.951) 
Conflict 3.184** 
(1.235) 
[24.135] 
Threat –0.396 
(1.574) 
Elected chief executive 0.387 
(1.067) 
Confidence vote 0.208 
(1.580) 
Eff. Parties –0.289 
(0.534) 
Eff. Parties(Declaration) 0.106 
(0.347) 
Eff. Parties(Extension) 0.204 
(0.299) 
Log likelihood –141.053 
N 852 
The main entries are logit coefficients; the figures in parentheses are Huber-White (robust) standard 
errors, adjusted for country-specific clustering; the figures in brackets are odds ratios. 
statistical significance: ***<0.01 **<.05  *<0.1 
The empirical analysis fails to provide any evidence for the institutional hypotheses presented above. 
Among the control variables, the only variable that draws statistical significance is conflict (p-score of 
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0.010), for which the odds ratio indicates that a country is about 24 times more likely to be under a 
state of emergency sometime during a year if it was involved in a conflict sometime during that year. 
This of course makes a lot of sense; armed conflict is a classic emergency situation for which the need 
for extraordinary powers is stated as a way of protecting the state and the citizens from attacks and 
restoring peace more quickly. 
 
7. Discussion and Conclusion 
This thesis empirically examined the effect of provisions governing key constitutional procedures 
governing states of emergency (and the degree to which they prescribe the involvement of the 
legislature in those procedures) on the prevalence of their use by democratic states. The approach was 
explicitly institutional, arguing that, by structuring political costs and incentives, institutions form an 
important influence on the actions of decision-makers. The influence of institutions was hypothesised 
to work in conjunction with practical circumstances (e.g. armed conflict), but effectively disregards 
any cultural or historic factors not directly reflecting the formal institutions governing states of 
emergency. Within the parameters of this study, the analysis presented above does not find enough 
evidence to suggest such an effect has any preponderance. On the one hand, while these are not 
positive results for the institutional approach, this study is nonetheless a beneficial start, offering 
useful lessons, such as the importance of the conflict variable. It is, of course, far from comprehensive, 
meaning that it still leaves many other possibilities for future research, On the other hand, this study 
could be interpreted differently – not through the paper’s initial hypotheses but through the lens of the 
argument made by Ackerman (2004), to the effect that the world’s existing constitutional emergency 
provisions are insufficient to curb the use of emergency powers. From this perspective, the failure to 
find an institutional effect should not be surprising, and could actually form a useful starting point for 
future research. This concluding discussion will address several potential issues the above results 
raise, while making suggestions for future research into the same subject. 
The main result from the empirical analysis is that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected – the strength 
of the legislative branch with regard to and during a state of emergency has not been shown to be a 
key variable in determining the prevalence of states of emergency. But of course, this paper merely 
represents a beginning for the institutional approach. Firstly, one must examine the imperfections of 
this paper’s research design. For example, an ordered logit, which would have broken down the 
declared states of emergency by territorial scope, might have picked up more of an effect. 
Alternatively, it is possible that the variables were not operationalised sufficiently well. Particularly 
the declaration and extension variable could have been coded differently; for example, instead of 
simply dividing the cases according to the degree of legislative involvement, declaration could have 
taken into account the threshold of legislative support, as some countries require a supermajority 
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(Ackerman 2004). The operationalisation of the dependent variable could also have been improved – 
for example by obtaining precise dates for the beginning and end of different states of emergency – 
though the result obtained for the conflict variable would seem to indicate that the lack of precision in 
the declared state of emergency variable was not so great as to fundamentally distort it. More precise 
data for parties, specifically including the parties in government at any time, could have contributed to 
more accurate results. Of course, ultimately what may be necessary to see a significant result might 
simply be more data – adding more years, in particular, would be a relatively simple expansion of this 
investigation. 
Alternatively, this study may be interpreted from the perspective that contemporary emergency 
provisions are indeed generally insufficient for the task of protecting against their excessive use, as 
Ackerman (2004) argues. The results presented above, which include virtually every democracy 
during the period in question, certainly meshes well with this point of view. And though it may sound 
that way, such a conclusion does not in fact dismiss the potential for further institutionalist research in 
this area – instead, it usefully points this research in the direction of constitutions that come closer to 
Ackerman’s own proposals. On this basis, future methodology with regard to this question should 
probably be more small-N, focusing on the relatively small number of constitutions exhibiting more 
restrictive or creative checks and balances than most. One such feature (recommended by Ackerman) 
is the ‘supermajoritarian escalator’, which progressively raises the bar for extension of a state of 
emergency; this option is rare, but has found at least one recent adoption (in the new Kenyan 
constitution – Elkin, Ginsburg & Melton 2009). But even without accepting Ackerman’s argument, 
there are of course other variations in emergency provisions which may deserve attention in future 
studies. Besides the size of majority required, the type of extraordinary powers activated by states of 
emergency could be important (including powers with regard to human rights, the enactment of 
emergency decrees, or control of otherwise independent agencies); alternatively, it might be the role of 
the judiciary or the ex-post facto accountability mechanisms that proves crucial in providing 
politicians with incentives to minimise their use of emergency powers. 
Though this study was based on the institutionalist perspective, the wider research agenda of finding 
out the determinants of the use of emergency powers, potential variables for further investigation are 
not limited to institutional provisions; the age of democracy may be a factor, or some measure of 
economic development – together, such factors may form different expectations and incentives for 
politicians in ways quite different from the ones described here. This thesis contributes to this with the 
one statistically significant coefficient obtained, that of the conflict variable. This result backs up the 
alternative hypothesis that the prevalence of states of emergency is the result of certain ‘emergency 
circumstances’, of which armed conflict would certainly be a major one. Indeed, this thesis did not 
aim to reject this hypothesis, merely to additionally find if there was evidence to support the 
importance of certain institutions. The value of this finding is, most importantly, that this variable is 
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indeed one that should be included in research into the determinants of use of emergency powers. 
More generally, it crystallises the type of context for which emergency powers are used in democracy: 
whether or not emergency powers should be associated with repression as so many previous writers 
have argued, emergency powers are associated with the presence of armed conflict. 
There is clearly still much research to be done on the question of what leads to the use of emergency 
powers. While this first attempt seems to indicate that some institutions regulating states of emergency 
may not matter much, there are clearly more institutional effects to be tested and perhaps also better 
ways of approaching the question. In the interest of designing more effective emergency provisions, 
this research should continue. As Ackerman (2004) writes, we have probably entered an era when 
governments have a renewed incentive to resort to extraordinary means to demonstrate their 
commitment to fight terrorism and other new threats. The task for constitutional designers is to design 
countervailing institutional incentives, ones that ensure that the damage to human rights is limited and 
that states of emergency remain temporary measures rather than permanent fixtures. Further empirical 
investigation would form the surest support for fostering our success in advancing these aims. 
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